Saturday, 1 March 2008

Tuesday, 26 February 2008

Comment about veteran advocacy

I posted this as one part of a comment reacting to a neoneocon post:

Humble veterans. I don’t mind when veterans are open about their military histories. I encourage it. I just care that they’re real histories. Much of why many veterans are silent about their military histories isn’t out of intrinsic humility about their service but because, as with any esoteric field of knowledge, it’s awkward to talk about things with people who don’t understand. I’ve found that to be the case even as a peace-time veteran, and it’s more the case with war veterans. When veterans get together? Believe me, the stories come out.

I encourage veterans to be open about their service because I was a campus military advocate in college who was sensitive to the civil-military gap. I believe veterans should take it upon themselves to build a greater presence and profile in our society, so that, one, our extended military community has a greater role in mainstream culture and infuses more military-related values into general civil society, and two, so veterans’ hard-earned honor and their years given to service can be meaningfully transferred as a competitive advantage in the civilian world. As it stands, many veterans earn their honor with years of sacrifice for the greater good of country and people, only to find out that they’ve lost those years as prime career-building time in the civilian world. Veterans deserve better, and to make it better, they have to compete for it just like any other identity-based special interest in our society.

Eric

Saturday, 23 February 2008

Provincial Reconstruction Team

The always-excellent Small Wars Journal has posted the link to a Princeton study about Provincial Reconstruction Teams or PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am very interested in the progress of PRTs because they represent a necessary strategic and tactical integration in peace-building, and I would like to be part of the evolution. What are PRTs?

EXCERPT:

I. Introduction

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are civil military organizations designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities. They were designed as a transitional structure to provide improved security and to facilitate reconstruction and economic development.

While the concept of integrated civil-military units has existed since the 1990s, PRTs were first implemented by the United States in 2002 during Operation Enduring Freedom following the invasion of Afghanistan. PRTs have since become a model used in Iraq and Afghanistan by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and European and other coalition members for introducing post-conflict, reconstruction, security, and development activities in areas still too hostile for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) relief agencies.

PRTs have become an integral part of peacekeeping and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they have also been criticized for their mixed effectiveness, over-emphasis on military objectives and priorities, failure to effectively coordinate and communicate with UN and NGO organizations, and differences in staffing and mission. Today, there are 50 PRTs: 25 in Afghanistan under the authority of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (NATO/ISAF), and 25 in Iraq.5 Of these, the United States leads 12 in Afghanistan and 22 in Iraq.
Read the rest of the study.

Eric

Monday, 18 February 2008

Snapshot of early challenges and our hope for Iraq

In the excellent Belmont Club, anti-war commentator desert rat referred to a wonderfully instructive snapshot from the Washington Post of the early challenges and our hope for Iraq: Occupation Forces Halt Elections Throughout Iraq by William Booth and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, June 28, 2003. (Article at commondreams.org) The article has been widely cited by anti-war people as proof that the liberal American promise for Iraq was a lie. I understood the article differently.

My reaction:
desert rat,

Thank you. That Washington Post article, in its entirety, is a highly worthwhile read as a snapshot of both the challenges we faced and the justification for our hopes at a critical early stage in the post-war. The WP piece agrees with stories told to me by a friend of mine who served in OIF I (as a soldier, not a CPA civilian). He was an EOD team leader whose jobs were the WMD hunt and destroying ammo stockpiles. He told me how local Iraqi leaders sought out any Americans in leadership positions - even him, an EOD SSG on a non-diplomatic mission - to start the process of building the post-Saddam Iraq. The problem was, while our soldiers were the only practical interface with Iraqis, it was not their job (as it is now) to manage the transition. It was the CPA's job, but they were absent on the ground.

It's terrific reporting by the WP. The Bush admin has been widely accused of being unaware of the conflictual complexities of Iraqi society. If anything, the record shows that the Bush admin was, perhaps, overly sensitive and cautious about those complexities (eg, Bremer's fear of Baathists and Sadrists filling the vacuum).

Given the internal conflicts, missing the right political structure, the Bush admin clearly didn't trust the Iraqi factions to avoid a civil war. In hindsight, perhaps we should have taken a step back from the outset, focused on security, and simply helped the Iraqis while they took the initiative in building their post-Saddam civil society. We would have needed to trust them that they could make that leap from their own history.

In any case, the WP piece captures the caution by Bremer over the complexities of Iraqi society, the desire to avoid the risks of local factions undermining national reconciliation, and the desire by Bremer for a deliberate controlled transition to a stable post-Saddam Iraq. He didn't want a nation-building project doomed to fracture due to a rushed transition cracked with instrinsic structural flaws.

Remember, we had recently watched Afghanistan and Yugoslavia fracture with bloody civil war. We didn't want that to happen in Iraq on our watch, and it was Bremer's job with the CPA to make sure it didn't happen.

The choice of Iraqi military leaders wasn't about creating a puppet government and keeping popularly elected leaders out of the political process, as was expressed by the disillusioned Iraqis in the article. Those generals were supposed to be interim managers who were trained to take orders, top-down, while the CPA organized a national political structure, according to a blueprint, that could incorporate democratically chosen leaders without the nation fracturing.

Sensitive tasks. On their face, Bremer's decisions made sense. In a more 'laboratory' setting, if Bremer had fewer variables, fewer destructive agents, more time, and better constructive agents, he maybe could have done his job.

Unfortunately, we know what happened. Bremer failed. He could not implement his blueprint for post-Saddam transition in Iraq in the deliberate controlled fashion he - and most of us - wanted.

The WP piece backs up my ex-EOD friend's experience that Iraqis did, in fact, trust Americans and were willing to work with us in the early post-war. Clearly, however, that trust was (understandably) conditional and it had its limits. The enemy successfully moved to exploit those limits at the same time Bremer and the CPA, while well-intentioned, were insufficiently competent to accomplish their mission.

Some say that the Iraqis had to go through the bloody turmoil of the last 5 years, a cruel learning curve, to arrive at where they are today. I can't be certain that view is wrong, but I disagree. I believe if GEN Petraeus and his COIN warriors had been in charge in Iraq immediately in the post-war, we would have a far different story in Iraq today.

As is, the Iraqis gave us a real chance to fulfill the American promise in 2003, and we failed them then. If they've given us another chance, I hope we don't fail the Iraqi people again.

Thanks, desert rat.

Eric

Cool website of the day: choose your candidate with Glassbooth Election 2008

Check out the Glassbooth Election 2008 website, which "connects you to the 2008 presidential candidate that represents your beliefs the best" using an interactive poll. It's not a deep study of the candidates and it's not meant to be, but it's definitely a user-friendly broad introduction to the candidates. I like how it asks you to tailor your priorities as a voter and then adjusts its questions accordingly. My strongest priority, is of course, the Long War and foreign policy.

I took the poll three times while tweaking my priorities, and interestingly, I matched up best with Mike Huckabee the first two times when I mixed domestic and foreign policy issues, which surprised me since I only know him through the media as an evangelical and I'm not religious (though I am a progressive, which is related). Second and third place flip-flopped between John McCain and Barack Obama. The third time, when my only priority was Iraq and foreign policy, John McCain was the runaway favorite with Huckabee 2nd and Obama 3rd. Basically, I'm liberal (foreign aid and humanitarian missions, diplomatic relations) and hawkish (win the war!) on foreign affairs and liberal (healthcare, unions, education, etc) in domestic politics.

I'll probably tweak my priorities some more and make a few more runs in the glassbooth. I'd love to try out similar websites if they're out there.

Thanks to tdaxp for the tip.

Update: In the comments of tdaxp's post, there's a referral to another candidate-matching website: selectsmart.com. In it, of the candidates still running, Obama (3rd) and Clinton (4th) tied for the lead as 'my' candidate , while McCain (6th) was slightly behind. In contrast to glassbooth, Mike Huckabee was a distant 14th. My guess is that the discrepancy stems from the simplified priority adjustor that fails to account for how much I'm weighting my foreign policy beliefs over my domestic beliefs in the 2008 election.

Eric

President Kennedy's Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs

President Kennedy was only President from January 1961 until his assassination in November 1963. His main accomplishment in that short time was to set a firm direction for the young liberal superpower with eloquently and powerfully stated ideals and ideas.

Where his inaugural speech laid a foundation of American ideals, President Kennedy's Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs on May 25, 1961 built upon that foundation a set of clear goals and ideas. Most striking is Kennedy's grasp of the evolving nature of geo-politics and warfare, the kind of military we need, the challenges they face, and the kind of missions they need to perform.

Since we are in the midst of the type of war for which Kennedy sought to prepare our nation, pay special attention to that part of his speech. I won't excerpt from it because the entire speech is worth reading, most of all for any American politician who fancies himself or herself a successor of JFK and a champion of his legacy. Anytime you forget what it means to be a liberal, go back to your John Kennedy and refresh yourself.

Eric

Sunday, 17 February 2008

Young veterans need to become a social movement

I feel very strongly about building the product and brand of 'veteran' in American society moving forward. I spent much of my college career focused on that goal. With that idea, I responded to a comment by Tigerhawk in his post "American soldiers then and now":

Tigerhawk: "Moreover, I think the Iraq veterans, as a generation, will have a very different influence over American institutions, political and otherwise, than the Vietnam generation did."

I hope that's true. However, the numbers gap and the civil-military gap argue against that happening. With numbers, such a relatively small number of the current young generation will have served, in peace- or war-time. Even fewer from the educated middle and upper classes that produce most of our civil leaders will have served. I doubt that by themselves, young veterans will be able to form a critical mass to be influential. More likely, young veterans will be forced to put away their hard-earned military heritage and assimilate into, rather than transform, civil society.

The civil-military gap further and dramatically diminishes the value of military experience in the young generation. For many young Americans - or Americans period - military service is at best an alien concept outside of their understanding, and at worst, they believe the negative stereotypes. Praise for the military is often cliched, thoughtless lip service. After all, the bestowed honor of military service derives from the deep appreciation of selfless service, sacrifice, and duty, yet those civic values have not been emphasized in our society, even after 9/11. Formative pop culture and many young people don't view the Long War as a noble cause, rather the opposite. Without that counter-balance of popular honor, the more-tangible consequences of military service, eg, life-long physical and mental injuries, deaths, reluctant participation in a frightening war, and highly visible loss of life, career, and academic opportunities are more tangible proof of the negative value of military service to the young generation . . . in other words, the civil-military gap.

With that said, I *very much* want the veterans of the current young generation to be and act proud of their military heritage and the honor they have earned. They did the harder right instead of the easier wrong and deserve to be rewarded. More importantly, their achievements ought to be set as the social standard for future generations. I want their service to translate as a positive influence in their lives and for society as a whole, with tangible benefits everyone can understand. I want the veterans' life-long civilian generational peers to come to wish, with regret, that they had volunteered to serve in the military, too. With the numbers and civil-military gaps, though, I just don't believe that phenomenon is going to happen by itself.

Moving forward, young veterans - if they want their military service to be valued and beneficial in their lives - need to take it upon themselves to build upon their military heritage in civil society rather than put it away.

We need many more visible, active, and attractive groups like the US Military Veterans of Columbia University (military veterans who are students at Columbia U.) and Hamilton Society (Columbia U.'s ROTC cadets and USMC officer candidates group) sprouting at grass roots in esteemed corners of civil society.

Young veterans need to make 'veteran' a dynamic, powerful product and - even more importantly - build a positive, attractive marketing brand for 'veteran' in civil society. This can only work as a growing movement; if more young veterans opt to sell out (and wholy assimilate) to the civil-military gap rather than buy into (and build the 'veteran' brand in) a veterans' movement, no one will make this social change happen for them.

Of course, any help from civilian supporters and members of older American generations would be helpful and appreciated. :)


Eric