From www.themiguy.blogspot.com: Iraq war plans.
Eric
Tuesday, 27 February 2007
Monday, 26 February 2007
Once again, why I 'voted' for SEN Joe Lieberman
From Wall Street Journal opinion page: The Choice on Iraq
"I appeal to my colleagues in Congress to step back and think carefully about what to do next."
BY JOSEPH LIEBERMAN
Monday, February 26, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
Two months into the 110th Congress, Washington has never been more bitterly divided over our mission in Iraq. The Senate and House of Representatives are bracing for parliamentary trench warfare--trapped in an escalating dynamic of division and confrontation that will neither resolve the tough challenges we face in Iraq nor strengthen our nation against its terrorist enemies around the world.
What is remarkable about this state of affairs in Washington is just how removed it is from what is actually happening in Iraq. There, the battle of Baghdad is now under way. A new commander, Gen. David Petraeus, has taken command, having been confirmed by the Senate, 81-0, just a few weeks ago. And a new strategy is being put into action, with thousands of additional American soldiers streaming into the Iraqi capital.
Congress thus faces a choice in the weeks and months ahead. Will we allow our actions to be driven by the changing conditions on the ground in Iraq--or by the unchanging political and ideological positions long ago staked out in Washington? What ultimately matters more to us: the real fight over there, or the political fight over here?
If we stopped the legislative maneuvering and looked to Baghdad, we would see what the new security strategy actually entails and how dramatically it differs from previous efforts. For the first time in the Iraqi capital, the focus of the U.S. military is not just training indigenous forces or chasing down insurgents, but ensuring basic security--meaning an end, at last, to the large-scale sectarian slaughter and ethnic cleansing that has paralyzed Iraq for the past year.
Tamping down this violence is more than a moral imperative. Al Qaeda's stated strategy in Iraq has been to provoke a Sunni-Shiite civil war, precisely because they recognize that it is their best chance to radicalize the country's politics, derail any hope of democracy in the Middle East, and drive the U.S. to despair and retreat. It also takes advantage of what has been the single greatest American weakness in Iraq: the absence of sufficient troops to protect ordinary Iraqis from violence and terrorism.
The new strategy at last begins to tackle these problems. Where previously there weren't enough soldiers to hold key neighborhoods after they had been cleared of extremists and militias, now more U.S. and Iraqi forces are either in place or on the way. Where previously American forces were based on the outskirts of Baghdad, unable to help secure the city, now they are living and working side-by-side with their Iraqi counterparts on small bases being set up throughout the capital.
At least four of these new joint bases have already been established in the Sunni neighborhoods in west Baghdad--the same neighborhoods where, just a few weeks ago, jihadists and death squads held sway. In the Shiite neighborhoods of east Baghdad, American troops are also moving in--and Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army are moving out.
We of course will not know whether this new strategy in Iraq will succeed for some time. Even under the most optimistic of scenarios, there will be more attacks and casualties in the months ahead, especially as our fanatical enemies react and attempt to thwart any perception of progress.
But the fact is that we are in a different place in Iraq today from even just a month ago--with a new strategy, a new commander, and more troops on the ground. We are now in a stronger position to ensure basic security--and with that, we are in a stronger position to marginalize the extremists and strengthen the moderates; a stronger position to foster the economic activity that will drain the insurgency and militias of public support; and a stronger position to press the Iraqi government to make the tough decisions that everyone acknowledges are necessary for progress.
Unfortunately, for many congressional opponents of the war, none of this seems to matter. As the battle of Baghdad just gets underway, they have already made up their minds about America's cause in Iraq, declaring their intention to put an end to the mission before we have had the time to see whether our new plan will work.
There is of course a direct and straightforward way that Congress could end the war, consistent with its authority under the Constitution: by cutting off funds. Yet this option is not being proposed. Critics of the war instead are planning to constrain and squeeze the current strategy and troops by a thousand cuts and conditions.
Among the specific ideas under consideration are to tangle up the deployment of requested reinforcements by imposing certain "readiness" standards, and to redraft the congressional authorization for the war, apparently in such a way that Congress will assume the role of commander in chief and dictate when, where and against whom U.S. troops can fight.
I understand the frustration, anger and exhaustion so many Americans feel about Iraq, the desire to throw up our hands and simply say, "Enough." And I am painfully aware of the enormous toll of this war in human life, and of the infuriating mistakes that have been made in the war's conduct.
But we must not make another terrible mistake now. Many of the worst errors in Iraq arose precisely because the Bush administration best-cased what would happen after Saddam was overthrown. Now many opponents of the war are making the very same best-case mistake--assuming we can pull back in the midst of a critical battle with impunity, even arguing that our retreat will reduce the terrorism and sectarian violence in Iraq.
In fact, halting the current security operation at midpoint, as virtually all of the congressional proposals seek to do, would have devastating consequences. It would put thousands of American troops already deployed in the heart of Baghdad in even greater danger--forced to choose between trying to hold their position without the required reinforcements or, more likely, abandoning them outright. A precipitous pullout would leave a gaping security vacuum in its wake, which terrorists, insurgents, militias and Iran would rush to fill--probably resulting in a spiral of ethnic cleansing and slaughter on a scale as yet unseen in Iraq.
I appeal to my colleagues in Congress to step back and think carefully about what to do next. Instead of undermining Gen. Petraeus before he has been in Iraq for even a month, let us give him and his troops the time and support they need to succeed.
Gen. Petraeus says he will be able to see whether progress is occurring by the end of the summer, so let us declare a truce in the Washington political war over Iraq until then. Let us come together around a constructive legislative agenda for our security: authorizing an increase in the size of the Army and Marines, funding the equipment and protection our troops need, monitoring progress on the ground in Iraq with oversight hearings, investigating contract procedures, and guaranteeing Iraq war veterans the first-class treatment and care they deserve when they come home.
We are at a critical moment in Iraq--at the beginning of a key battle, in the midst of a war that is irretrievably bound up in an even bigger, global struggle against the totalitarian ideology of radical Islamism. However tired, however frustrated, however angry we may feel, we must remember that our forces in Iraq carry America's cause--the cause of freedom--which we abandon at our peril.
Mr. Lieberman is an Independent senator from Connecticut.
"I appeal to my colleagues in Congress to step back and think carefully about what to do next."
BY JOSEPH LIEBERMAN
Monday, February 26, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
Two months into the 110th Congress, Washington has never been more bitterly divided over our mission in Iraq. The Senate and House of Representatives are bracing for parliamentary trench warfare--trapped in an escalating dynamic of division and confrontation that will neither resolve the tough challenges we face in Iraq nor strengthen our nation against its terrorist enemies around the world.
What is remarkable about this state of affairs in Washington is just how removed it is from what is actually happening in Iraq. There, the battle of Baghdad is now under way. A new commander, Gen. David Petraeus, has taken command, having been confirmed by the Senate, 81-0, just a few weeks ago. And a new strategy is being put into action, with thousands of additional American soldiers streaming into the Iraqi capital.
Congress thus faces a choice in the weeks and months ahead. Will we allow our actions to be driven by the changing conditions on the ground in Iraq--or by the unchanging political and ideological positions long ago staked out in Washington? What ultimately matters more to us: the real fight over there, or the political fight over here?
If we stopped the legislative maneuvering and looked to Baghdad, we would see what the new security strategy actually entails and how dramatically it differs from previous efforts. For the first time in the Iraqi capital, the focus of the U.S. military is not just training indigenous forces or chasing down insurgents, but ensuring basic security--meaning an end, at last, to the large-scale sectarian slaughter and ethnic cleansing that has paralyzed Iraq for the past year.
Tamping down this violence is more than a moral imperative. Al Qaeda's stated strategy in Iraq has been to provoke a Sunni-Shiite civil war, precisely because they recognize that it is their best chance to radicalize the country's politics, derail any hope of democracy in the Middle East, and drive the U.S. to despair and retreat. It also takes advantage of what has been the single greatest American weakness in Iraq: the absence of sufficient troops to protect ordinary Iraqis from violence and terrorism.
The new strategy at last begins to tackle these problems. Where previously there weren't enough soldiers to hold key neighborhoods after they had been cleared of extremists and militias, now more U.S. and Iraqi forces are either in place or on the way. Where previously American forces were based on the outskirts of Baghdad, unable to help secure the city, now they are living and working side-by-side with their Iraqi counterparts on small bases being set up throughout the capital.
At least four of these new joint bases have already been established in the Sunni neighborhoods in west Baghdad--the same neighborhoods where, just a few weeks ago, jihadists and death squads held sway. In the Shiite neighborhoods of east Baghdad, American troops are also moving in--and Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army are moving out.
We of course will not know whether this new strategy in Iraq will succeed for some time. Even under the most optimistic of scenarios, there will be more attacks and casualties in the months ahead, especially as our fanatical enemies react and attempt to thwart any perception of progress.
But the fact is that we are in a different place in Iraq today from even just a month ago--with a new strategy, a new commander, and more troops on the ground. We are now in a stronger position to ensure basic security--and with that, we are in a stronger position to marginalize the extremists and strengthen the moderates; a stronger position to foster the economic activity that will drain the insurgency and militias of public support; and a stronger position to press the Iraqi government to make the tough decisions that everyone acknowledges are necessary for progress.
Unfortunately, for many congressional opponents of the war, none of this seems to matter. As the battle of Baghdad just gets underway, they have already made up their minds about America's cause in Iraq, declaring their intention to put an end to the mission before we have had the time to see whether our new plan will work.
There is of course a direct and straightforward way that Congress could end the war, consistent with its authority under the Constitution: by cutting off funds. Yet this option is not being proposed. Critics of the war instead are planning to constrain and squeeze the current strategy and troops by a thousand cuts and conditions.
Among the specific ideas under consideration are to tangle up the deployment of requested reinforcements by imposing certain "readiness" standards, and to redraft the congressional authorization for the war, apparently in such a way that Congress will assume the role of commander in chief and dictate when, where and against whom U.S. troops can fight.
I understand the frustration, anger and exhaustion so many Americans feel about Iraq, the desire to throw up our hands and simply say, "Enough." And I am painfully aware of the enormous toll of this war in human life, and of the infuriating mistakes that have been made in the war's conduct.
But we must not make another terrible mistake now. Many of the worst errors in Iraq arose precisely because the Bush administration best-cased what would happen after Saddam was overthrown. Now many opponents of the war are making the very same best-case mistake--assuming we can pull back in the midst of a critical battle with impunity, even arguing that our retreat will reduce the terrorism and sectarian violence in Iraq.
In fact, halting the current security operation at midpoint, as virtually all of the congressional proposals seek to do, would have devastating consequences. It would put thousands of American troops already deployed in the heart of Baghdad in even greater danger--forced to choose between trying to hold their position without the required reinforcements or, more likely, abandoning them outright. A precipitous pullout would leave a gaping security vacuum in its wake, which terrorists, insurgents, militias and Iran would rush to fill--probably resulting in a spiral of ethnic cleansing and slaughter on a scale as yet unseen in Iraq.
I appeal to my colleagues in Congress to step back and think carefully about what to do next. Instead of undermining Gen. Petraeus before he has been in Iraq for even a month, let us give him and his troops the time and support they need to succeed.
Gen. Petraeus says he will be able to see whether progress is occurring by the end of the summer, so let us declare a truce in the Washington political war over Iraq until then. Let us come together around a constructive legislative agenda for our security: authorizing an increase in the size of the Army and Marines, funding the equipment and protection our troops need, monitoring progress on the ground in Iraq with oversight hearings, investigating contract procedures, and guaranteeing Iraq war veterans the first-class treatment and care they deserve when they come home.
We are at a critical moment in Iraq--at the beginning of a key battle, in the midst of a war that is irretrievably bound up in an even bigger, global struggle against the totalitarian ideology of radical Islamism. However tired, however frustrated, however angry we may feel, we must remember that our forces in Iraq carry America's cause--the cause of freedom--which we abandon at our peril.
Mr. Lieberman is an Independent senator from Connecticut.
Sunday, 25 February 2007
Crushing on fictional movie women - a list
Here is a list of fictional movie and television women I've been fictionally attracted to. It's not just about looks, although as a factor, physical appeal does carry a lot of weight. It's more about character, demeanor, personality, and carriage. Note that a crush on the character does not imply a crush on the real-life actress.
Kristy Briggs (She's Having a Baby, Elizabeth McGovern): Kristy Briggs goes to the top of the list as the standard-bearer for the kind of girl I'd like to marry someday.
Thandiwe Adjewa (Flirting, Thandie Newton)
Monique Junot (Better Off Dead, Diane Franklin)
Anne Shirley (Anne of Green Gables, Megan Follows)
Dorothy Boyd (Jerry Maguire, Renée Zellweger)
Winnie Cooper (The Wonder Years, Danica McKellar)
Dharma Montgomery (Dharma & Greg, Jenna Elfman)
Meg March (Little Women, Trini Alvarado)
Amy Archer (Hudsucker Proxy, Jennifer Jason Leigh)
Lia (Monsters, La Strega, Linda Blair)
Eric
Kristy Briggs (She's Having a Baby, Elizabeth McGovern): Kristy Briggs goes to the top of the list as the standard-bearer for the kind of girl I'd like to marry someday.
Thandiwe Adjewa (Flirting, Thandie Newton)
Monique Junot (Better Off Dead, Diane Franklin)
Anne Shirley (Anne of Green Gables, Megan Follows)
Dorothy Boyd (Jerry Maguire, Renée Zellweger)
Winnie Cooper (The Wonder Years, Danica McKellar)
Dharma Montgomery (Dharma & Greg, Jenna Elfman)
Meg March (Little Women, Trini Alvarado)
Amy Archer (Hudsucker Proxy, Jennifer Jason Leigh)
Lia (Monsters, La Strega, Linda Blair)
Eric
Friday, 16 February 2007
Me in the Columbia Spectator
The purpose of this post is a ready-access list for my own reference. It's not hard to find me in C-Spec's on-line archives. Just go to their website and search for my name, which probably will be necessary anyway given that C-Spec frequently changes its URL format.
28MAR09 UPDATE: Okay ... now, after the latest C-Spec remodeling, try this page.
21AUG08 UPDATE: The links I used below are dead again. As of today, at least, links to my columns are collected in this page on C-Spec's website.
Opinion columns by me:
Wednesday, September 26, 2001: Protecting Our Earned Freedom
Monday, October 1, 2001: When War is the Answer
Wednesday, October 10, 2001: The Misguided Movement
Friday, October 19, 2001: The Less Loyal Among Us
Friday, November 9, 2001: The Power of Diversity
Wednesday, November 21, 2001: The First Step of a Long War
Friday, February 1, 2002: A Love Story
Friday, February 15, 2002: Fighting the War at the Source
Friday, March 29, 2002: A Time to Serve
Friday, April 12, 2002: ROTC Belongs at Columbia
Friday, April 26, 2002: Proud to Be a Grunt
Thursday, July 11, 2002: Undercover Brother
Tuesday, September 17, 2002: Changing Times at Columbia
Wednesday, October 16, 2002: Leaders and Lanes
Wednesday, November 13, 2002: Veterans Day Reflections
Wednesday, November 27, 2002: Weighing in on Iraq
Wednesday, January 29, 2003: Rangel's Wake-Up Call
Tuesday, October 24, 2006: Doing Our Part in a Time of War
Thursday, February 15, 2007: When Anti-war is Anti-peace *
Tuesday, September, 14, 2010: America needs ROTC at Columbia
Letter(s) to the editor from me:
Monday, November 19, 2001: SU4V Apologizes for Posters (ghost-writer for Jen Thorpe)
Thursday, April 10, 2003: ROTC Program Would be Valuable to Columbia Community
Friday, September 15, 2006: ROTC not Such a Victory: Progressives Should Welcome Change
Articles, opinion columns, and letters to the editor that say my name:
Tuesday, October 2, 2001: (Letter) Owen's 'Dulce et Decorum Est' Is an Ironic View of War
Wednesday, October 3, 2001: (Letter) War Protestors Are Noble and Sometimes Poetic--Not Laughable
Monday, October 15, 2001: (Letter) Anti-War Movement Binds Activists In Commitment to Mediation
Monday, October 22, 2001: (News) New Group Approves Of Military Response
Tuesday, February 19, 2002: (Letter) Military Does Not Belong in Schools, As Writer Suggests
Monday, September 9, 2002: (News) University Plans Sept. 11 Remembrance Ceremony
Thursday, September 26, 2002: (Letter) Columnist Failed to Grasp Consequences of ROTC Program
Monday, February 3, 2003: (News) ROTC Return Proposals Provoke Activist Criticism
Thursday, February 13, 2003: (Opinion) The Myth of Anti-Military Bias
Thursday, April 21, 2005: (News) ROTC Debate Continues at Open Forum
Tuesday, April 26, 2005: (News) Panelists Examine ROTC's Role on Campus
Thursday, November 02, 2006: (The Eye) Why Patriotism is the Campus Taboo
Monday, November 28, 2011: (Feature) For MilVets, a long journey to campus prominence
Tuesday, November 29, 2011: (Feature) After political fights, MilVets expands
- Eric
28MAR09 UPDATE: Okay ... now, after the latest C-Spec remodeling, try this page.
21AUG08 UPDATE: The links I used below are dead again. As of today, at least, links to my columns are collected in this page on C-Spec's website.
Opinion columns by me:
Wednesday, September 26, 2001: Protecting Our Earned Freedom
Monday, October 1, 2001: When War is the Answer
Wednesday, October 10, 2001: The Misguided Movement
Friday, October 19, 2001: The Less Loyal Among Us
Friday, November 9, 2001: The Power of Diversity
Wednesday, November 21, 2001: The First Step of a Long War
Friday, February 1, 2002: A Love Story
Friday, February 15, 2002: Fighting the War at the Source
Friday, March 29, 2002: A Time to Serve
Friday, April 12, 2002: ROTC Belongs at Columbia
Friday, April 26, 2002: Proud to Be a Grunt
Thursday, July 11, 2002: Undercover Brother
Tuesday, September 17, 2002: Changing Times at Columbia
Wednesday, October 16, 2002: Leaders and Lanes
Wednesday, November 13, 2002: Veterans Day Reflections
Wednesday, November 27, 2002: Weighing in on Iraq
Wednesday, January 29, 2003: Rangel's Wake-Up Call
Tuesday, October 24, 2006: Doing Our Part in a Time of War
Thursday, February 15, 2007: When Anti-war is Anti-peace *
Tuesday, September, 14, 2010: America needs ROTC at Columbia
Letter(s) to the editor from me:
Monday, November 19, 2001: SU4V Apologizes for Posters (ghost-writer for Jen Thorpe)
Thursday, April 10, 2003: ROTC Program Would be Valuable to Columbia Community
Friday, September 15, 2006: ROTC not Such a Victory: Progressives Should Welcome Change
Articles, opinion columns, and letters to the editor that say my name:
Tuesday, October 2, 2001: (Letter) Owen's 'Dulce et Decorum Est' Is an Ironic View of War
Wednesday, October 3, 2001: (Letter) War Protestors Are Noble and Sometimes Poetic--Not Laughable
Monday, October 15, 2001: (Letter) Anti-War Movement Binds Activists In Commitment to Mediation
Monday, October 22, 2001: (News) New Group Approves Of Military Response
Tuesday, February 19, 2002: (Letter) Military Does Not Belong in Schools, As Writer Suggests
Monday, September 9, 2002: (News) University Plans Sept. 11 Remembrance Ceremony
Thursday, September 26, 2002: (Letter) Columnist Failed to Grasp Consequences of ROTC Program
Monday, February 3, 2003: (News) ROTC Return Proposals Provoke Activist Criticism
Thursday, February 13, 2003: (Opinion) The Myth of Anti-Military Bias
Thursday, April 21, 2005: (News) ROTC Debate Continues at Open Forum
Tuesday, April 26, 2005: (News) Panelists Examine ROTC's Role on Campus
Thursday, November 02, 2006: (The Eye) Why Patriotism is the Campus Taboo
Monday, November 28, 2011: (Feature) For MilVets, a long journey to campus prominence
Tuesday, November 29, 2011: (Feature) After political fights, MilVets expands
- Eric
Thursday, 15 February 2007
Spec opinion: When Anti-War is Anti-Peace
I'm in the Columbia Spectator today with my column When Anti-war is Anti-peace.
I have mixed feelings about it. The Spec used an edited version of my original submission. However, I had written a revised version which I refined last night and today with the help of Carly Hoffman, a Spec (associate?) opinion editor. I was happier with the revision than the original. Apparently, some miscommunication or some other decision was made somewhere and my original submission was used. The upside is that the article is more timely in today's Spec, given the anti-war protests on campus, and that was my original hope and intent. Admittedly, the substance of the message didn't change that much from the original submission to the revision, and I did submit it, so I can't cry foul (too loudly). You can compare for yourself. Open the link and read the edited original on the Spec website and then scroll down for the revised and unpublished version below. Tell me what you think, and enjoy.
UNPUBLISHED REVISION:
When Anti-War is Anti-Peace by Eric ****
The calls for the United States to leave Iraq are reaching a frantic crescendo, and the precedent they most often cite is how Congress ended support for South Vietnam. However, while the Vietnam precedent for withdrawing from war is widely known, less understood has been the damage to peace caused by that retreat. The traumatic Vietnam episode convinced American leaders that peace operations in "non-permissive" environments were a misguided national security strategy. As a result, the peace-building options we needed at the outset of our current conflict were unavailable.
Since 9/11, peace building has returned to our strategic thinking, and the Iraq mission has become our greatest test for peace operations in "non-permissive" environments. What are peace operations? Essentially, they are the full-spectrum processes that transform failed regions into viable states that are secure, can sustain development and integrate into the international community, and are stable and effectively governed. Peace operations also encompass the organizations—private sector, government, international, and military civil affairs—that engage in humanitarian intervention, development, and aid.
If we make the deliberate decision to abandon Iraq, then we can forget about peace building in other "non-permissive" environments. Our peace-building capability will be swept away in the political fall-out, just as it was after the Vietnam War. Leading "anti-war" Congressman John Murtha, for example, is actually very hawkish . . . about China. He just vehemently opposes peace operations, whether they are in 2003 Iraq or 1993 Somalia.
I'm not as hard on President Bush's administration for our post-war planning failures in Iraq because I understand much of it was due to the lack of pre-mission capability. After all, how do you fix a country with an absence of tools and know-how for doing it? The easy answer is that you call someone else to fix it, and that's basically how we planned for the post-war in Iraq. We've learned the hard way that there is no one else to call and we are responsible for completing the job we started.
The solution to the mess depends on whether the peace operations community, thrown into the deep end of the pool since 9/11, can struggle out from the legacy of the Vietnam War. Doing so requires a bloody, expensive learning curve. Unfortunately, too many people we mean to help and protect, as well as our own peace operators, have died as the price for learning fundamental lessons while opposed by enemies who expertly attack our weaknesses.
But, are we learning? I contend that we are. Recently, I had the privilege of attending two peace operations conferences, the first in Washington DC and the second in SIPA. I was impressed by the dedication of both military and civilians to win the war by building peace and struck by the degree to which the Vietnam War had undermined the ability of peace agencies to handle the "operations other than war" that are center-stage in the War on Terror. Nonetheless, I was buoyed by the candid admissions of failure and the progress that has been made toward reforming everything from personnel to doctrine to institutional cultures. Participants spoke about the General Petraeus-led troop surge, with its accompanying strategic shifts, as a necessary re-orientation for the peace process in Iraq. It was hammered home – mostly by civilian peace operators humbled in Iraq - that in "non-permissive" environments, the military must be the main agent of peace. As a senior USAID representative stated, "if you [the military] expect a follow-on civilian force to replace you, don't. It's not coming."
My final impression was more emotional. My heart broke as I listened to the lessons learned by peace operators and their hopes for the future while knowing that outside, the "anti-war" movement was tearing down their mission. I especially was moved by the desire of the military officers to secure a better future for the Iraqi people - all the military participants had served in Iraq and expected to return. During the Washington conference, I studied the reactions of two Iraqi embassy liaisons while they listened intently to Americans taking personal responsibility for the fate of Iraq. I wondered how they reconciled the peace operators with the "anti-war" activists who accuse coalition forces of "[refusing] to even validate the lives of Iraqis." At the end of the Columbia conference, a United Nations representative asked whether the American commitment to peace operations would outlast a "regime change" in the next presidential election. Her fear was a massive, and most likely untenable, shift of responsibility to the UN in Iraq should the United States abandon our peace operations there.
Retreat from Iraq won't end the American commitment to peace around the world. However, our success or failure in Iraq sets the benchmark for intervention anywhere, such as Darfur, defined by violent opposition. Today, I am afraid the rising tide of the "anti-war" movement will destroy our capability to build peace, gained through so great a sacrifice, in the places of the world that need our help the most.
The author is a graduate of the school of General Studies, major in political science, and is the co-founder of Students United for America.
Eric
I have mixed feelings about it. The Spec used an edited version of my original submission. However, I had written a revised version which I refined last night and today with the help of Carly Hoffman, a Spec (associate?) opinion editor. I was happier with the revision than the original. Apparently, some miscommunication or some other decision was made somewhere and my original submission was used. The upside is that the article is more timely in today's Spec, given the anti-war protests on campus, and that was my original hope and intent. Admittedly, the substance of the message didn't change that much from the original submission to the revision, and I did submit it, so I can't cry foul (too loudly). You can compare for yourself. Open the link and read the edited original on the Spec website and then scroll down for the revised and unpublished version below. Tell me what you think, and enjoy.
UNPUBLISHED REVISION:
When Anti-War is Anti-Peace by Eric ****
The calls for the United States to leave Iraq are reaching a frantic crescendo, and the precedent they most often cite is how Congress ended support for South Vietnam. However, while the Vietnam precedent for withdrawing from war is widely known, less understood has been the damage to peace caused by that retreat. The traumatic Vietnam episode convinced American leaders that peace operations in "non-permissive" environments were a misguided national security strategy. As a result, the peace-building options we needed at the outset of our current conflict were unavailable.
Since 9/11, peace building has returned to our strategic thinking, and the Iraq mission has become our greatest test for peace operations in "non-permissive" environments. What are peace operations? Essentially, they are the full-spectrum processes that transform failed regions into viable states that are secure, can sustain development and integrate into the international community, and are stable and effectively governed. Peace operations also encompass the organizations—private sector, government, international, and military civil affairs—that engage in humanitarian intervention, development, and aid.
If we make the deliberate decision to abandon Iraq, then we can forget about peace building in other "non-permissive" environments. Our peace-building capability will be swept away in the political fall-out, just as it was after the Vietnam War. Leading "anti-war" Congressman John Murtha, for example, is actually very hawkish . . . about China. He just vehemently opposes peace operations, whether they are in 2003 Iraq or 1993 Somalia.
I'm not as hard on President Bush's administration for our post-war planning failures in Iraq because I understand much of it was due to the lack of pre-mission capability. After all, how do you fix a country with an absence of tools and know-how for doing it? The easy answer is that you call someone else to fix it, and that's basically how we planned for the post-war in Iraq. We've learned the hard way that there is no one else to call and we are responsible for completing the job we started.
The solution to the mess depends on whether the peace operations community, thrown into the deep end of the pool since 9/11, can struggle out from the legacy of the Vietnam War. Doing so requires a bloody, expensive learning curve. Unfortunately, too many people we mean to help and protect, as well as our own peace operators, have died as the price for learning fundamental lessons while opposed by enemies who expertly attack our weaknesses.
But, are we learning? I contend that we are. Recently, I had the privilege of attending two peace operations conferences, the first in Washington DC and the second in SIPA. I was impressed by the dedication of both military and civilians to win the war by building peace and struck by the degree to which the Vietnam War had undermined the ability of peace agencies to handle the "operations other than war" that are center-stage in the War on Terror. Nonetheless, I was buoyed by the candid admissions of failure and the progress that has been made toward reforming everything from personnel to doctrine to institutional cultures. Participants spoke about the General Petraeus-led troop surge, with its accompanying strategic shifts, as a necessary re-orientation for the peace process in Iraq. It was hammered home – mostly by civilian peace operators humbled in Iraq - that in "non-permissive" environments, the military must be the main agent of peace. As a senior USAID representative stated, "if you [the military] expect a follow-on civilian force to replace you, don't. It's not coming."
My final impression was more emotional. My heart broke as I listened to the lessons learned by peace operators and their hopes for the future while knowing that outside, the "anti-war" movement was tearing down their mission. I especially was moved by the desire of the military officers to secure a better future for the Iraqi people - all the military participants had served in Iraq and expected to return. During the Washington conference, I studied the reactions of two Iraqi embassy liaisons while they listened intently to Americans taking personal responsibility for the fate of Iraq. I wondered how they reconciled the peace operators with the "anti-war" activists who accuse coalition forces of "[refusing] to even validate the lives of Iraqis." At the end of the Columbia conference, a United Nations representative asked whether the American commitment to peace operations would outlast a "regime change" in the next presidential election. Her fear was a massive, and most likely untenable, shift of responsibility to the UN in Iraq should the United States abandon our peace operations there.
Retreat from Iraq won't end the American commitment to peace around the world. However, our success or failure in Iraq sets the benchmark for intervention anywhere, such as Darfur, defined by violent opposition. Today, I am afraid the rising tide of the "anti-war" movement will destroy our capability to build peace, gained through so great a sacrifice, in the places of the world that need our help the most.
The author is a graduate of the school of General Studies, major in political science, and is the co-founder of Students United for America.
Eric
Wednesday, 14 February 2007
Columbia graduate - it's official!
As of 14 February 2007, I am officially a Columbia University graduate.
Eric
Saturday, 10 February 2007
Feb 5, 2007: Statement of Senator Joe Lieberman on Senate Iraq Resolutions
Again . . . why I 'voted' for Joe Lieberman this past Election Day:
WASHINGTON – Senator Joseph Lieberman (ID-CT) delivered the following statement today on the Senate floor:
(As Prepared for Delivery)
Mr. President, our nation has reached a critical crossroad in the war in Iraq. More than four years ago, this chamber voted to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein, a tyrant who slaughtered his own people, attacked his neighbors, and threatened our security. Thanks to the courageous service of the men and women of our military, that evil regime was overthrown. And in its place came hopes of democracy in the heart of the Middle East and a victory in the war for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world.
As of today, those hopes have not been realized. Because of the ruthless conduct of our enemies, as well as our own failures, we instead today find ourselves on a knife’s edge in Iraq.
Now, a new course has been chosen. A new commander is in place in Iraq, confirmed by this Senate. A new Secretary of Defense is in place at the Pentagon, confirmed by this Senate. And a new strategy has begun to be put into action on the ground in Iraq by our troops.
It is altogether proper that we debate our policy in Iraq. It should be a debate that is as serious as the situation in Iraq and that reflects the powers the Constitution gives to Congress in matters of war.
But that, sadly, is not the debate that the Warner-Levin resolution invites us to have. I am going to speak strongly against this resolution because I feel strongly about it. I do so with respect for my colleagues who have offered it, but I believe its passage would so compromise America’s security, present and future, that I will say so in the clearest terms I can.
The resolution before us, its sponsors concede, will not stop the new strategy from going forward. As we speak, thousands of troops are already in Baghdad, with thousands more moving into position to carry out their Commander’s orders. This resolution does nothing to alter these facts.
Instead, its sponsors say it will send a message of rebuke from the Senate to the president, from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. But there is a world beyond Pennsylvania Avenue that is watching and listening.
What we say here is being heard in Baghdad by Iraqi moderates, trying to decide whether the Americans will stand with them. We are being heard by our men and women in uniform, who will be interested to know whether we support the plan they have begun to carry out. We are being heard by the leaders of the thuggish regimes in Iran and Syria, and by Al Qaeda terrorists, eager for evidence that America’s will is breaking. And we are being heard across America by our constituents, who are wondering if their Congress is capable of serious action, not just hollow posturing.
This resolution is not about Congress taking responsibility. It is the opposite. It is a resolution of irresolution.
For the Senate to take up a symbolic vote of no confidence on the eve of a decisive battle is unprecedented, but it is not inconsequential. It is an act which, I fear, will discourage our troops, hearten our enemies, and showcase our disunity. And that is why I will vote against cloture.
If you believe that General Petraeus and his new strategy have a reasonable chance of success in Iraq, then you should resolve to support him and his troops through the difficult days ahead. On the other hand, if you believe that this new strategy is flawed or that our cause is hopeless in Iraq, then you should vote to stop it. Vote to cut off funds. Vote for a binding timeline for American withdrawal. If that is where your convictions lie, then have the courage of your convictions to accept the consequences of your convictions. That would be a resolution.
The non-binding measure before us, by contrast, is an accumulation of ambiguities and inconsistencies. It is at once for the war but also against the war. It pledges its support to the troops in the field but also washes its hands of what they are doing. It approves more troops for Anbar but not for Baghdad.
We cannot have it both ways. We cannot vote full confidence in General Petraeus, but no confidence in his strategy. We cannot say that the troops have our full support, but disavow their mission on the eve of battle. This is what happens when you try to wage war by committee. That is why the Constitution gave that authority to the President as Commander in Chief.
Cynics may say this kind of thing happens all of the time in Congress. In this case, however, they are wrong. If it passed, this resolution would be unique in American legislative history. I contacted the Library of Congress on this question last week and was told that, never before, when American soldiers have been in harm’s way, fighting and dying in a conflict that Congress had voted to authorize, has Congress turned around and passed a resolution like this, disapproving of a particular battlefield strategy.
I ask each of my colleagues to stop for a moment and consider this history carefully. Even during Vietnam, even after the Tet Offensive, even after the invasion of Cambodia, Congress did not take up a resolution like this one.
Past Congresses certainly debated wars. They argued heatedly about them. And they clashed directly with the Executive Branch over their execution. But in doing so they accepted the consequences of their convictions.
This resolution does no such thing. It is simply an expression of opinion. It does not pretend to have any substantive effect on policy on the ground in Iraq.
But again, I ask you: what will this resolution say to our soldiers? What will it say to our allies? And what will it say to our enemies?
We heard from General Petraeus during his confirmation hearing that war is a battle of wills. Our enemies believe that they are winning in Iraq today. They believe that they can outlast us; that, sooner or later, we will tire of this grinding conflict and go home. That is the lesson that Osama bin Laden took from our retreats from Lebanon and Somalia in the 1980s and 1990s. It is a belief at the core of the insurgency in Iraq, and at the core of radical Islam worldwide. And this resolution—by codifying our disunity, by disavowing the mission our troops are about to undertake—confirms our enemies’ belief in American weakness.
This resolution also sends a terrible message to our allies. I agree that we must hold the Iraqi government to account. That is exactly what the resolution Senator McCain and I have offered would do. But I ask you: Imagine for a moment that you are a Sunni or Shia politician in Baghdad who wants the violence to end—and ask yourself how the Warner-Levin resolution will affect your thinking, your calculations of risk, your willingness to stand against the forces of extremism. Every day, you are threatened by enemies who want nothing but to inflict the most brutal imaginable horrors on you and your loved ones. Will this resolution empower you, or will it undermine you? Will it make you feel safer, or will it make you feel you should hedge your bets, or go over to the extremists, or leave the country?
And finally, what is the message this resolution sends to our soldiers? I know that everyone here supports our troops—but actions have consequences, often unintended. When we send a message of irresolution, it does not support our troops. When we renounce their mission, it does not support our troops.
We heard recently in the Senate Armed Services Committee from General Jack Keane, who said of this resolution. “It’s just not helpful… What the enemy sees is an erosion of the political and moral will of the American people… Our soldiers are Americans first. They clearly understand there’s a political process in this country that they clearly support… But at the end of the day, they are going to go out and do a tough mission, and I certainly would like to see them supported in that mission as opposed to declaring non-support....”
Everyone here knows that the American people are frustrated about the lack of progress in Iraq. Everyone here shares that frustration. And as elected representatives of the people, everyone here feels pressure to give expression to that frustration.
This is not a new challenge. It is one that every democracy in every long, difficult war has had to confront.
Nearly a century and a half ago, at a site not far from here, an American president wrestled with just this problem. It was in the midst of a terrible war—a civil war—in which hundreds of thousands of Americans were fighting and dying to secure the freedom of millions long and cruelly denied it.
“We here highly resolve…”—that was Lincoln’s message at Gettysburg. It was a message of resolution, of conviction against adversity, of hope against despair, and of confidence in the cause of freedom, which is America’s cause.
Today, in the depths of a terrible war, on the brink of a decisive battle for Baghdad, let us have a serious debate about where we stand and where we must go in Iraq. That is the debate we should have—but it is not the debate that this resolution would bring.
The sixty vote requirement to close debate was put in place by our predecessors as a way to stop the passions of the moment from sweeping across our country and through Congress in a way that will jeopardize our future. Because I believe this resolution, if passed, would have such an effect, I will respectfully oppose the motion for cloture.
I thank the President and yield the floor.
WASHINGTON – Senator Joseph Lieberman (ID-CT) delivered the following statement today on the Senate floor:
(As Prepared for Delivery)
Mr. President, our nation has reached a critical crossroad in the war in Iraq. More than four years ago, this chamber voted to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein, a tyrant who slaughtered his own people, attacked his neighbors, and threatened our security. Thanks to the courageous service of the men and women of our military, that evil regime was overthrown. And in its place came hopes of democracy in the heart of the Middle East and a victory in the war for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world.
As of today, those hopes have not been realized. Because of the ruthless conduct of our enemies, as well as our own failures, we instead today find ourselves on a knife’s edge in Iraq.
Now, a new course has been chosen. A new commander is in place in Iraq, confirmed by this Senate. A new Secretary of Defense is in place at the Pentagon, confirmed by this Senate. And a new strategy has begun to be put into action on the ground in Iraq by our troops.
It is altogether proper that we debate our policy in Iraq. It should be a debate that is as serious as the situation in Iraq and that reflects the powers the Constitution gives to Congress in matters of war.
But that, sadly, is not the debate that the Warner-Levin resolution invites us to have. I am going to speak strongly against this resolution because I feel strongly about it. I do so with respect for my colleagues who have offered it, but I believe its passage would so compromise America’s security, present and future, that I will say so in the clearest terms I can.
The resolution before us, its sponsors concede, will not stop the new strategy from going forward. As we speak, thousands of troops are already in Baghdad, with thousands more moving into position to carry out their Commander’s orders. This resolution does nothing to alter these facts.
Instead, its sponsors say it will send a message of rebuke from the Senate to the president, from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. But there is a world beyond Pennsylvania Avenue that is watching and listening.
What we say here is being heard in Baghdad by Iraqi moderates, trying to decide whether the Americans will stand with them. We are being heard by our men and women in uniform, who will be interested to know whether we support the plan they have begun to carry out. We are being heard by the leaders of the thuggish regimes in Iran and Syria, and by Al Qaeda terrorists, eager for evidence that America’s will is breaking. And we are being heard across America by our constituents, who are wondering if their Congress is capable of serious action, not just hollow posturing.
This resolution is not about Congress taking responsibility. It is the opposite. It is a resolution of irresolution.
For the Senate to take up a symbolic vote of no confidence on the eve of a decisive battle is unprecedented, but it is not inconsequential. It is an act which, I fear, will discourage our troops, hearten our enemies, and showcase our disunity. And that is why I will vote against cloture.
If you believe that General Petraeus and his new strategy have a reasonable chance of success in Iraq, then you should resolve to support him and his troops through the difficult days ahead. On the other hand, if you believe that this new strategy is flawed or that our cause is hopeless in Iraq, then you should vote to stop it. Vote to cut off funds. Vote for a binding timeline for American withdrawal. If that is where your convictions lie, then have the courage of your convictions to accept the consequences of your convictions. That would be a resolution.
The non-binding measure before us, by contrast, is an accumulation of ambiguities and inconsistencies. It is at once for the war but also against the war. It pledges its support to the troops in the field but also washes its hands of what they are doing. It approves more troops for Anbar but not for Baghdad.
We cannot have it both ways. We cannot vote full confidence in General Petraeus, but no confidence in his strategy. We cannot say that the troops have our full support, but disavow their mission on the eve of battle. This is what happens when you try to wage war by committee. That is why the Constitution gave that authority to the President as Commander in Chief.
Cynics may say this kind of thing happens all of the time in Congress. In this case, however, they are wrong. If it passed, this resolution would be unique in American legislative history. I contacted the Library of Congress on this question last week and was told that, never before, when American soldiers have been in harm’s way, fighting and dying in a conflict that Congress had voted to authorize, has Congress turned around and passed a resolution like this, disapproving of a particular battlefield strategy.
I ask each of my colleagues to stop for a moment and consider this history carefully. Even during Vietnam, even after the Tet Offensive, even after the invasion of Cambodia, Congress did not take up a resolution like this one.
Past Congresses certainly debated wars. They argued heatedly about them. And they clashed directly with the Executive Branch over their execution. But in doing so they accepted the consequences of their convictions.
This resolution does no such thing. It is simply an expression of opinion. It does not pretend to have any substantive effect on policy on the ground in Iraq.
But again, I ask you: what will this resolution say to our soldiers? What will it say to our allies? And what will it say to our enemies?
We heard from General Petraeus during his confirmation hearing that war is a battle of wills. Our enemies believe that they are winning in Iraq today. They believe that they can outlast us; that, sooner or later, we will tire of this grinding conflict and go home. That is the lesson that Osama bin Laden took from our retreats from Lebanon and Somalia in the 1980s and 1990s. It is a belief at the core of the insurgency in Iraq, and at the core of radical Islam worldwide. And this resolution—by codifying our disunity, by disavowing the mission our troops are about to undertake—confirms our enemies’ belief in American weakness.
This resolution also sends a terrible message to our allies. I agree that we must hold the Iraqi government to account. That is exactly what the resolution Senator McCain and I have offered would do. But I ask you: Imagine for a moment that you are a Sunni or Shia politician in Baghdad who wants the violence to end—and ask yourself how the Warner-Levin resolution will affect your thinking, your calculations of risk, your willingness to stand against the forces of extremism. Every day, you are threatened by enemies who want nothing but to inflict the most brutal imaginable horrors on you and your loved ones. Will this resolution empower you, or will it undermine you? Will it make you feel safer, or will it make you feel you should hedge your bets, or go over to the extremists, or leave the country?
And finally, what is the message this resolution sends to our soldiers? I know that everyone here supports our troops—but actions have consequences, often unintended. When we send a message of irresolution, it does not support our troops. When we renounce their mission, it does not support our troops.
We heard recently in the Senate Armed Services Committee from General Jack Keane, who said of this resolution. “It’s just not helpful… What the enemy sees is an erosion of the political and moral will of the American people… Our soldiers are Americans first. They clearly understand there’s a political process in this country that they clearly support… But at the end of the day, they are going to go out and do a tough mission, and I certainly would like to see them supported in that mission as opposed to declaring non-support....”
Everyone here knows that the American people are frustrated about the lack of progress in Iraq. Everyone here shares that frustration. And as elected representatives of the people, everyone here feels pressure to give expression to that frustration.
This is not a new challenge. It is one that every democracy in every long, difficult war has had to confront.
Nearly a century and a half ago, at a site not far from here, an American president wrestled with just this problem. It was in the midst of a terrible war—a civil war—in which hundreds of thousands of Americans were fighting and dying to secure the freedom of millions long and cruelly denied it.
“We here highly resolve…”—that was Lincoln’s message at Gettysburg. It was a message of resolution, of conviction against adversity, of hope against despair, and of confidence in the cause of freedom, which is America’s cause.
Today, in the depths of a terrible war, on the brink of a decisive battle for Baghdad, let us have a serious debate about where we stand and where we must go in Iraq. That is the debate we should have—but it is not the debate that this resolution would bring.
The sixty vote requirement to close debate was put in place by our predecessors as a way to stop the passions of the moment from sweeping across our country and through Congress in a way that will jeopardize our future. Because I believe this resolution, if passed, would have such an effect, I will respectfully oppose the motion for cloture.
I thank the President and yield the floor.
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